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This paper’s goal is to examine the effect of foreign aid on income 
inequality and poverty reduction for the period 1971-2002. Since simple 
cross-country regressions cannot be taken as “true” time series findings we 
focus on dynamic panel data techniques, which allow accounting for 
potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems. We find some weak 
evidence that foreign aid is conducive to the improvement of the 
distribution of income when the quality of institutions is taken into 
account, however, this result is not robust. This finding is consistent with 
recent empirical research on aid ineffectiveness in achieving economic 
growth or promoting democratic institutions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the post colonial era, foreign aid has been one of the main vehicles for the rich 
countries to promote better living conditions in less developed parts of the world, 
alleviation of poverty and narrowing income disparities having been viewed as its main 
goals.  Yet, the effectiveness of foreign aid has been often questioned, much recent 
research focusing in particular on average growth effects of foreign aid.  While Burnside 
and Dollar, 2000, qualify the argument that aid can promote growth by the recipient 
countries having good institutions, in more recent work even this moderate conclusion 
has been questioned.  Thus, Easterly, 2003, Easterly et al., 2004, and Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2005, claim that there is no evidence of any effect of aid on growth – even 
when institutional quality is high; and  Brautigam and Knack, 2004, and Knack, 2004, 
argue that aid may, in fact, cause deterioration in the quality of democratic institutions. 
  Foreign aid, however, may still be beneficial in other respects, for example, by 
improving the lot of the poorer population segments in receiving countries.  It may help 
to alleviate poverty and equalize income distribution, without necessarily having a 
discernible average growth effect.   While both constitute major objectives of aid giving, 
to our knowledge, there is surprisingly limited formal empirical evidence on this issue.
1   
  From a broad brushed look at the data, there appears to be some tentative 
evidence pointing towards the existence of a relationship between foreign aid and income 
inequality in the presence of good institutions see Figure 1. Thus, when corruption is at 
the bottom third tercile, an increase in foreign aid from low to medium is linked to a 
                                                       
1 Masud and Yontcheva (2005) cite a few references and perform analyses focusing on specific channels of 
foreign aid and developmental outcomes, such and health indicators; more generally, the recent World 
Development Report (World Bank, 2006) argues that aid does not seem to have an equalizing effect.  Arvin 
and Barillas, 2002, employ Granger causality to address causality issues present in the relationship between 
aid and poverty.   3
reduction in the Gini coefficient from 0.47 to 0.42 approximately; additionally, if foreign 
aid increases from medium to high, inequality remains relatively stable. The opposite 
occurs when the level of corruption is at the top higher tercile. When foreign aid 
increases from low to medium, the Gini coefficient does not change; however, when 
foreign aid increases from medium to high the Gini increases from 0.43 to 0.46
2.  This 
possible association between foreign aid and income distribution appears to have 
motivated policymakers as it is often implicitly assumed that foreign aid has an 
egalitarian effect despite the fact that there have been little efforts to formally establish it. 
  
     FIGURE  1 HERE 
 
  Simple correlations and even cross country analyses may, however, be misleading in 
this context, and appropriate econometric methods to minimize potential endogeneity in 
the regressors are called for. To the extent possible, our empirical approach is systematic 
and comprehensive and uses panel methods that try to deal with possible endogeneity 
problems explicitly (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1997).  We believe 
that the application of such dynamic panel technique is a valuable contribution to a 
thorough understanding of the issue at hand.  Based on this analysis, we conclude that 
foreign aid does not appear to have a significant income distribution effect, even in the 
presence of good institutions.  This negative result concurs with the much more extensive 
literature on aid and growth cited above, as well as with the literature that examines the 
effect of aid on democratic institutions, see Brautigam and Knack, 2004, and Knack, 
                                                       
2 The link between foreign aid and poverty is less clear, although the relevance of institutions in such link is 
quite apparent in simple data observation. 
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2004.  Arvin and Barillas, 2002, also examine the relationship between aid and poverty, 
using a different econometric tool, the Granger causality.  While the two papers are 
complementary to each other, the advantage of the dynamic panel analysis presented here 
is that it is a priori agnostic as to the nature of causal relationship between variables. 
  The next section presents a simple analytical framework that is used to address 
the link between aid and the welfare of the poor.  Section 3 then describes the data used 
in the paper as well as simple correlations and cross-country regressions. In Section 4 we 
undertake a more formal empirical analysis. Our findings show that while foreign aid is 
negatively linked with inequality in the presence of low corruption such outcome does 
not appear to be particularly robust.  Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. The model 
Consider two countries, a poor recipient and a rich donor.  The model focuses on the 
interactions between the governments of the two.  Both governments derive utility from 
objectives that hinge upon the situation in the recipient country.  In particular, to tailor 
the model closer to the ensuing empirical analysis, we assume that both governments care 
about the distribution of income there, see Boone, 1996, for related arguments.  For 
analytical simplicity we assume that the recipient country has two income classes and 
denote ep and er the market endowments of the two classes, ep < er, i.e., the respective 
amounts of income prior to transfers.  To avoid dealing with issues involving population 
size we normalize the size of each group to one.  The recipient country’s exogenously 
given budget, normalized to one, is used to transfer income to the population groups; the 
donor country determines its aid budget A to donate to the poor country.  The final   5
income distribution is determined by initial, market endowments supplemented by the 
transfers, and we denote xp and xr the respective income levels.  It is assumed that the 
domestic government derives utility from the incomes enjoyed by both income groups, 
 V(xp, xr)           ( 1 )  
whereas the utility of the donor government derives from the poor income in the recipient 
country and from transfers to own country’s citizens, z: 
 U(xp, z)          ( 2 )  
Both utility functions satisfy standard assumptions. 
Including another component in the recipient government’s utility, the benefit 
from aid’s diversion to government consumption, would not change the thrust of the 
results, but would also generate an additional implication that aid effectiveness hinges 
upon institutions constraining the ability to divert aid.  As this is a relatively simple 
extension of the basic framework, its complete analysis is left outside the main 
presentation but is available on request. 
The donor country’s budget, B, is allocated between aid and own transfers, 
  A + z  =   B           ( 3 )  
     
We distinguish between the case where the donor government provides aid to the 
recipient government which then allocates it among the income groups, and the one 
where aid commitment to the poor can be directly made by the donor government. 
  
2.2. Analysis 
Case 1: Aid is delivered through domestic government   6
The domestic government maximizes the utility (1) subject to the government budget 
constraint: 
  bp + br  =   A + 1           ( 4 )  
where bp and br denote budget transfers to the poor and the rich, respectively; to the 
income production constraints: 
  xj = ej + bj,     j   =   p ,   r          ( 5 )  
and to non-negativity constraints: 
  bj > 0, or xj > ej,   j   =   p ,   r         ( 6 )  
Ignoring the less interesting corner solution and letting H() denote the demand function 
for the income of the poor, some standard derivations enable us to write the optimal 
solution as follows: 
  xp = H(A+1 + ep + er),  xr = A+1 - H(A+1 + ep + er)     (7)     
 
so that the increase in the income of the poor as a result of a one dollar aid increase is 
H’(A+1 + ep + er) < 1.  For example, when the domestic government’s utility is Cobb-
Douglas,   V(xp, xr) = βlog(xp) + (1-β)log(xr), 0 < β < ½ , then H(A+1 + ep + er) = β (A+1 
+ ep + er) and dxp/dA = β. 
  Note that imposing constitutional constraints on the amount of transfers to the rich 
would enhance the effectiveness of aid in reducing inequality by decreasing the extent of 
aid fungibility.  In this regard, the model can be viewed as implying that aid effectiveness 
hinges upon institutional quality. 
  The equilibrium amount of aid maximizes then the donor government’s utility 
subject to the budget constraint and to the reaction of the recipient government, and the 
first order condition is:   7
 U 1 H’ – U2  =   0            ( 8 )    
 
For example, when the donor government’s utility is Cobb-Douglas,   U(xp, z) = αlog(xp) 
+ (1-α)log(z), 0 < α < 1 , then the above condition can be written as follows: 
  αβ/xp - (1-α)/z = αβ/(ep + A) - (1-α)/(B-A)  =  0     (8’) 
and the second order condition clearly holds.  Totally differentiating (8’) we then obtain 
that  
 dA/dep = -(αβ/(ep + A))
2 / [-(αβ/(ep + A))
2 – ((1-α)/(B-A))
2]  (9) 
 
which is positive, implying that the amount of aid flows should be positively related to 
the poor income in the recipient country. 
        
Case 2: Aid can be directly delivered by the donor government 
In this case, the domestic government’s budget constraint is: 
bp + br  =   1           ( 1 0 )  
 
whereas the income production functions are: 
  xp = A + ep + bp,  xr = er + br            ( 1 1 )  
 
When A is large enough, so that the marginal value of further supporting the poor is 
small from the viewpoint of the donor government, then only transfers to the rich will be 
made. 
The minimal value of A for this to hold is easy to derive:   
Up(ep+A*, er+1)/ Ur(ep+A*, er+1)  =  1     (12)   8
 
If, however, A<A* then the poor also receive the domestic government’s transfer given by: 
 U p(ep+A+ bp, er+1- bp)/ Ur(ep+A+ bp, er+1- bp)  =  1     (13) 
 
In this case, an increase in foreign aid will be offset by a decrease in the domestic 
government’s support for the poor.  To determine the magnitude of the net effect we write 
the transfer allocation problem of the domestic government as maximizing the utility 
 U(xp, xr) 
subject to   
  xp +  xr = 1 + ep+ A + er 
 
The solution to this problem is given by xp = H(1 + ep+ A + er), and H’(1 + ep+ A + er) < 1 
is the increase in the income of the poor as a result of a marginal increase in foreign aid.  
Note that this is the same as if aid could not be directly delivered by the donor government.  
The equilibrium amount of aid then maximized the donor government’s utility subject to 
the above reaction function, and the first order condition is as in (8) and, as can be easily 
shown it increases with the income of the poor, precisely as in the former case. 
  Summarizing, we obtain  
 
Proposition 1.  When aid cannot be directly delivered to the poor by the donor 
government, only a fraction of it reaches the poor; this fraction is higher the less fungible 
transfers to the rich are. Further, if the amount of aid is not sufficiently large, this is the 
outcome even when direct delivery of aid by the donor government is feasible because of   9
the crowding out of domestic transfers with foreign aid.  Also, the amount of aid flows is 
positively related to the income of the poor in the recipient country. 
 
These results suggest that, unless it is provided in a large amount, foreign aid is generally 
unlikely to reach its intended beneficiaries in its entirety and some leaks should be 
expected; and even when it is directly provided to the poor, domestic government decreases 
its transfers correspondingly so that the effective amount of total transfers remains the 
same.  Further, these leaks are inversely related to the relative weighting of the poor 
income by the domestic government, so that, in particular, when it is controlled by rich 
elites who do not care much about the poor, a small part of foreign aid will reach its 
destination.  Additionally, the equilibrium aid donations are positively related to the 
income of the poor, so that poverty in the recipient country causes larger aid flows. 
 
3. PRELIMINARY EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. The data 
Our inequality data come from the World Income Inequality Database released by the 
United Nations (2006)
3. These data are based on household surveys; also, the population 
and income coverage are comprehensive, and different criteria from various sources are 
homogenized in order to avoid problems of definition
4. In particular, we use the Gini 
Index as a measure of inequality which is available for 111 countries from 1970 to 2005.  
                                                       
3 These data are based on Deininger & Squire (2004), the Luxembourg Income Study, UNICEF, and 
several research studies from Central Statistical Offices (United Nations, 2006). 
4 Definitional problems include whether a category applies to household or individuals, whether income is 
measured gross or net of taxes, and whether expenditure or income is used to calculate the Gini coefficient, 
see Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001; however, there is no better proxy available to make broad cross-country 
comparisons of inequality. 
5 Countries included are Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,   10
Additionally, our poverty proxies come from a recently released data set by the World 
Bank, estimated using a program developed by Chen and Ravallion (2000) and based on 
primary data information from 454 household surveys covering 97 developing countries. 
Following Chen and Ravallion (2000), the data were standardized using purchasing 
power parity estimates for consumption produced by the World Bank (2004
6).  We were 
able to estimate tri-annual poverty indicators of the generic class of additive indices 
proposed by Foster et. al. (1984) for the period 1981-2001
7.  
In particular, we use the so-called poverty headcount index, the poverty gap 
index, and the squared poverty gap. The headcount index, or FGT(0), represents the 
percentage of population living below the poverty line. The main limitation of this index 
is that it does not takes in account the extent of poverty among the poor: for example, 
someone just below the poverty line is not in the same situation as on with no income at 
all. The second index attempts to solve this problem; the poverty gap index, or FGT(1),  
is defined as the mean shortfall from the poverty line when counting the non poor as 
having zero shortfall, and expressed as a percentage of the poverty line.  While this index 
provides a better indication of the depth of poverty, its shortcoming is that it does not 
take in account any inequality among the poor in the sense that it will stay unaffected 
                                                                                                                                                              
Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Albania, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Turkey, China, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Kribati, 
Lao, Malaysia, Marshall, Micronesia, Mongolia, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tonga, Vanuatu, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, 
Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe. 
6 The poverty estimates were calculated using World Bank’s PovCal (Chen and Ravallion, 2000) as such, 
they are imperfect, especially in what refers to the application to purchasing power parity estimates. These, 
however, are the best available poverty measures when comparing large number of countries in a time 
series.   11
even if one poor transfers money to someone less poor. The FGT(2) index, or squared 
poverty gap, is similar to the previous index except that the poverty gaps are squared, 
thus giving the highest weighting to the largest poverty gap and hence providing an 
indicator of the severity of poverty.
8 
With respect to the foreign aid data used in this paper, we include three different 
concepts: official development assistance (ODA), effective development assistance 
(EDA), and aid commitments. The first one is our preferred measure and is based on the 
standard definition of aid according to the Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD (2006).  It takes into account grants and concessional loans net of repayment of 
previous aid loans and treats forgiveness of past loans as current aid. In general, it is 
considered a reasonable measure of the actual transfer to liquidity-constrained 
governments. For this variable there is data for 176 countries for the period 1970 to 2002.  
The second foreign aid indicator used is the effective development assistance, 
developed by Chang et al. (1998). This measure includes the grant element of aid and 
excludes the loan component of concessional loans which are made at extremely low 
interest rates. The premise is that the official development assistance may not accurately 
measure the cost that donors incur in connection with their aid flows, and as a result, the 
evolution of net official development assistance over time, as well as across donors and 
recipients, likely provides a distorted picture of aid trends. When using this approach, we 
end up with a sample of 133 countries for the period 1975-1995
9. Finally, our third 
                                                                                                                                                              













1 ) ( where, x is a non-negative parameter, 
z is the poverty line or the threshold income/consumption below which someone is considered poor, and yi 
is a measure of living standard. We use three poverty measures, when x = 0, 1, and 2. 
8 See Atkinson, 1987, for a comprehensive discussion of poverty measures and how they are related to 
inequality measures. 
9 Interestingly, the correlation between official development assistance and effective development 
assistance is extremely high, about 0.94, obtained by regressing official development assistance on   12
concept of aid is based on country aid commitments, which reflect firm obligation, 
expressed in writing and backed by the necessary funds, undertaken by an official donor 
to provide specified assistance to a recipient country or a multilateral organization. 
Bilateral commitments are recorded in the full amount of expected transfer, irrespective 
of the time required for the completion of disbursements (OECD, 2006)
10.  In this case 
the size of the sample reaches 191 countries for the period 1973-2002.   All the measures 
of foreign aid used in this paper are calculated as percentages of gross domestic product 
(World Bank, 2004).  
 
    TABLE  1  HERE 
 
Our key institutional variable is the measure of corruption based on the Political 
Risk Rating from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2006) that is concerned 
with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job 
reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between 
politics and business. The most common form of corruption encountered directly by 
businesses is financial corruption in the form of demands for special payments and bribes 
connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police 
protection, or loans. The original measure ranges from 0 to 6. We rescaled this variable to 
go from 0 to 1, where 0 represents the lowest level of corruption
11. Other variables 
                                                                                                                                                              
effective development assistance. Easterly (2003) has questioned the reliability of the EDA data during 
1970-1974 as the calculation of the grant element began in 1975, only.  
10 Multilateral commitments are not taken into account. 
11 Our corruption variable covers the period 1982-2005, only. We take advantage of the high correlation 
between the Freedom House data (Gastil, 1990) and the ICRG data (ICRG, 2006) to obtain estimates of 
corruption from 1973 to 1981 by running a simple bivariate regression between these two variables since 
the simple correlation between them is negative and statistically significant at one percent.  A similar   13
employed in our analysis are real gross domestic product per capita, the inflation rate, 
liquid liabilities, and the literacy rate (World Bank, 2006).  Table 1 provides detailed 
definitions of all the variables employed; Table 2 presents basic summary statistics; and 
Table 3 shows simple correlation among variables.  
 
    TABLES 2 AND 3  HERE  
 
3.2. A FIRST APPROXIMATION: CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE  
We first take a simplistic approach and run cross-country regressions.  In the case of 
income inequality we take simple averages for the period 1972-2001 for each variable 
and run cross-country regressions in the spirit of Barro (1991) by postulating the 
following specification: 
yi   =   β0 +  Xi β1  +   Si β2  +  εi                          (14) 
where yi represents income inequality, as proxied by the Gini coefficient
12.   Similarly, Xi 
represents the matrix of basic controls which includes the level of initial gross domestic 
product per capita in 1972, the literacy rate, liquid liabilities (M3) as a percentage of 
gross domestic product, and the inflation rate. Additionally, Si represents the matrix of 
our variables of interest, that is, a proxy for institutions and either of the three measures 
of foreign aid described above. We use the latest inequality measure available for each 
country in order to minimize potential endogeneity.  For the case of poverty measures we 
take the same approach as above, but because of the more limited data the variables are 
averaged from 1980 to 2001, only. The basic empirical specification is suggested by the 
                                                                                                                                                              
method was applied by Barro (1991).  Nevertheless, reducing the sample to go from 1982 to 2002 does not 
change the results.  
12 We also tested changes instead of levels. Results are never statistically significant.   14
available literature on inequality and poverty (Deininger and Squire, 2004; Li, et al., 
1998; World Bank, 2004, and others).  On the right hand side, we consider foreign aid 
relative to gross domestic product and corruption as key explanatory variables. We also 
include liquid liabilities, the inflation rate, the initial gross domestic product per capita, 
the literacy rate, and continental dummies. 
 
     TABLE  4  HERE 
 
Table 4 shows our basic results. All foreign aid variables yield coefficients that 
have negative signs which are statistically significant at conventional levels. Also we find 
that the interactive term between aid and corruption yields the expected sign and is 
statistically significant
13. Aid appears to be associated with income inequality in the 
context of good institutions, as measured by low corruption, only. Notice that whereas the 
corruption variable by itself does not yield the expected positive sign, this finding is 
economically irrelevant, as the variable is never statistically significant regardless of the 
foreign aid measure used
14.  
 
    TABLE  5  HERE 
 
  Table 5 changes the focus of the analysis towards the effects of foreign aid on 
poverty reduction. While we run a similar specification as in the case of income 
                                                       
13 When testing other institutional variables from well-known sources (ICRG, World Bank) we obtain 
mixed results. While the institutional variable by itself is almost never statistically significant, the 
interaction with aid is weakly statistically significant in about thirty percent of the cases --ten variables. 
14 This is particularly true in developing countries, where as a result of corruption and bad institutions, 
resources that are supposed to reach the poorest end up wasted, typically diverted to the less poor (Chong 
and Gradstein, 2004).   15
inequality, here we only show the selected coefficients of our variables of interest, 
namely our aid proxies, and their interactions with corruption
15. Unlike the results shown 
for income inequality, we do not find any effects of foreign aid neither on poverty 
headcount nor in poverty severity. Although we find the expected signs for all of our 
variables, they do not reach the conventional levels of statistical significance. Moreover, 
even in the presence of good institutions, as measured by low corruption, it seems that 
foreign aid does not help reduce poverty, as the interactive term is not statistically 
significant. 
 
4. DYNAMIC PANEL DATA APPROACH  
The cross-country findings above are likely to be biased due to common problems of 
simultaneity and reverse causation that may arise because income inequality and poverty 
may be affected by foreign aid, as well as aid allocation may be driven by poverty and 
income inequality. The analytical framework indicates that disentangling the causality 
relationship between aid and income distribution could be difficult, as aid flows are 
expected to be higher into countries with particularly high levels of poverty, as well as to 
cause changes in income distribution.  Econometrically, a panel data approach should 
help resolve the causal aid effect on poverty and inequality. In this regard, some previous 
theoretical and empirical research on related issues gives some guidance on the most 
appropriate methodology to follow.   Previous panel data research shows that inequality 
has been highly stable in recent decades (Li et al., 1998), and that the correlation of 
inequality between the 1960s and 1980s has hovered around 0.85. Further, the average 
ratio of incomes of the richest five percent to the poorest five percent across countries has 
                                                       
15 We tested a very broad range of specifications and the results do not change. Poverty measures remain   16
barely moved, from 33.2 in 1960 to 31.7 in 1985 (Bruno et al., 1998).  Likewise, there are 
several studies have pointed out the persistence of poverty in developed and developing 
countries (Bane and Elwood, 1986; Huff, 1999; Wright, 1992; Hoynes et. al., 2006). This 
suggests that both income inequality and poverty are persistent series. Past levels of 
inequality and poverty may be important predictors of current levels of income inequality 
and poverty, respectively, which is likely to bias the cross section findings.  
  A reasonable alternative to dealing with the problem of persistence as well as 
with that of endogeneity is to use a dynamic panel specification. The use of a dynamic 
specification introduces potential problems of serial correlation in the error process. The 
presence of serial correlation is important not only because of its implications in testing 
the validity of the instruments used in the regression analysis but also because of its 
impact on the consistency of the estimates. As suggested by the literature (Loayza et al. 
2000), the modeling strategy for panel data equations with autoregressive errors consists 
in specifying a dynamic regression with uncorrelated disturbances, which implies the 
need for the lagged value of the dependent variable as an additional control.  Taking into 
account the particular characteristics of the series under examination, we consider as the 
most suitable estimation method the fixed effects dynamic panel data GMM-IV 
techniques (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1997).  By using this method 
we estimate a regression equation in differences and a regression equation in levels 
simultaneously, with each equation using its own specific set of instrumental variables. 
Notice that by applying this method, there is no need to account for fixed effects 
explicitly as the estimation is testing for differences
16.  
                                                                                                                                                              
statistically insignificant to foreign aid. 
16 This approach has been used by Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Rajan and Subramanian (2005) in the 
context of the link between foreign aid and economic growth.    17
  The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether lagged values of the 
explanatory variables are valid instruments in the regression.  We address this issue by 
considering two specification tests suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano 
and Bover (1995). The first is a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions, which tests 
the overall validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analog of the moment 
conditions used in the estimation process. Failure to reject the null hypothesis gives 
support to the model.   The second test examines the hypothesis that the error term is not 
serially correlated.  We test whether the differenced error term (that is, the residual of the 
regression in differences) is first-, and second-order serially correlated.  First-order serial 
correlation of the differenced error term is expected even if the original error term (in 
levels) is uncorrelated, unless the latter follows a random walk.  Second-order serial 
correlation of the differenced residual indicates that the original error term is serially 
correlated and follows a moving average process at least of order one.  If the test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of absence of second-order serial correlation, we conclude that 
the original error term is serially uncorrelated and use the corresponding moment 
conditions.   
 
       TABLE  6  HERE 
 
  Our benchmark specification is similar to the one presented in the cross section, 
namely, we control for gross domestic product per capita, liquid liabilities, inflation rate, 
literacy, corruption and focus on two variables of interest, foreign aid and its interaction 
with corruption.  Additionally, as shown above, income inequality and poverty tend to be 
persistent, thus consistent with the dynamic panel method employed, we also control for   18
lagged dependent variable values.  In the case of our inequality regressions we use an 
annual unbalanced panel that goes from 1970 to 2005.  However, since our poverty data 
are available tri-annually, we use three-year averages and construct a balanced panel that 
goes from 1981 to 2001.  Table 6 shows the results when using the dynamic panel data 
method described above.  We find a negative sign for our variable of interest, although it 
is not statistically significant. Further, we find evidence on the link between foreign aid 
and corruption with respect to income inequality, as shown by the interactive term
17. 
However, in the case of our preferred foreign aid measure, the coefficient of the 




       TABLE  7  HERE 
 
  Using similar specifications, we also test for the association between foreign aid 
and poverty. Table 7 shows the coefficients and standard errors of our variables of 
interest
19. Even though we find the expected signs for our variables of interest as well as 
for the interactive terms between foreign aid and corruption, the resulting coefficients are 
not statistically significant in most cases, with the exception of regressions that use the 
aid commitment, the weakest measure of the three used in this paper, as a proxy for 
foreign aid. Furthermore, the overall effect of foreign aid on poverty is not statistically 
significant in most of the cases.  
                                                       
17 We also tested both the Theil inequality measure as well as several dimensions of the Atkinson inequality 
index obtaining very similar results. 
18 In the case of the interaction between corruption and aid commitment we obtain a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient at five percent. When testing additional institutional variables we obtain 
mixed results, similar as in the cross-section as only about twenty percent of the additional case are 
statistically significant at conventional levels (also, see footnote 12)    19
  In general, the validity of our set of instruments is confirmed by the two tests 
proposed. The first test, the Hansen test of over identification of restrictions is rejected 
for both the inequality and poverty regressions. At the same time, we find that the error 
terms of our differenced equations follow an autoregressive process of first order, but not 
of second order, which implies that the error terms of the levels equation does not follow 
an autoregressive process. Also, the hypothesized dynamic structure of the model is 
confirmed by the highly significant and positive coefficients of the first lag of our 
dependent variable
20.  
      
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper contributes to the literature on aid effectiveness by examining the effect of aid 
on income distribution and poverty.  While these constitute the primary objectives of 
foreign aid, research on how their achievement is affected by foreign aid is very scarce.  
We focus on both the direct effect of aid and on how this effect is possibly mediated by 
recipient countries' institutions, trying to carefully deal with endogeneity concerns. 
  In line with the recent line of research that discerns failures of foreign aid to 
promote growth even in the presence of good institutions (e.g., Easterly, 2003, and 
Easterly et al., 2004) or to enhance the quality of democratic institutions (Brautigam and 
Knack, 2004, and Knack, 2004), we find that aid by itself does not appear to have a 
statistically significant effect on inequality and poverty reduction.  While both our simple 
cross-section approach and our dynamic panel estimation seem to suggest that good 
                                                                                                                                                              
19 Full regression results are available upon request. 
20 Results are robust to changes in specification, as well as to different lag structures of the equations and 
sets of instrumental variables. Furthermore, in the instrumental variable matrix we also include external 
instruments, in particular, legal origin and a linguistic fractionalization index. Exclusion of all the external 
instruments does not change our results. Also, notice that poverty and inequality persistence are 
unconditional on the presence of other regressors.   20
institutions may be necessary for aid to reach the poor, we fail to detect any robust impact 
of foreign aid in this regard, even when institutional quality is taken into consideration.  
Whereas these results complement the existing ones that deal with the growth effects of 
aid, the urgency of the examined objectives makes the apparent ineffectiveness of aid 
appear even more dramatic.    21
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TABLE 1 
DEFINITIONS AND SOURCES 
Variable  Definition 
Gini Index  It measures the extent to which the distribution of income  among individuals or households within an economy deviates from 
a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots the cumulative percentages of total income received against the 
cumulative number of recipients, starting with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between 
the Lorenz curve and a hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. 
Thus a Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. Source: United Nations 
(2006). 
Poverty Headcount Index Population below $1 a day is the percentage of the population living on less than $1.08 a day ($32.74 per month) at 1993 
international prices. Source: PovcalNet (World Bank). See Chen and Ravallion (2000) for  description of calculations.  
Poverty Gap  Poverty gap is the mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non poor as having zero shortfall), expressed as a 
percentage of the poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as its incidence. Source: PovcalNet (World 
Bank). See Chen and Ravallion (2004) for a detailed description of calculations.  
Squared Poverty Gap  In addition to the Head Count and Poverty Gap Indices, a third measure which better reflects changes in the severity of 
poverty is the Squared Poverty Gap Index. This is defined similar to the Poverty Gap Index except that the poverty gaps are 
squared, thus giving the highest weighting to the largest poverty gap. The need for this Index arises because the Poverty Gap 
Index may not adequately capture concerns over distribution changes within the poor. For example, if a policy resulted in 
money transfer from someone just below the poverty line to the poorest person, the Squared Poverty Gap Index will reflect 
this change, while the Poverty Gap Index will not. Source: PovcalNet (World Bank). See Chen and Ravallion (2004) for a 






ODA is based on the standard definition of aid according to the OECD. It takes into account grants and concessional loans net 
of repayment of previous aid loans and treats forgiveness of past loans as current aid. It includes grants or loans to countries 
and territories on Part I of the DAC List of Aid Recipients (developing countries) which are  undertaken by the official sector, 
with promotion of economic development and welfare as the main objective,  at concessional financial terms (if a loan, have a 
grant element of at least 25 per cent); grants, loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Source: OECD. 
EDA/GDP  EDA (as percentage of GDP) is defined as the sum of grant equivalents and grants, excluding technical assistance. EDA = 
EDA GQ + Grants - TA - B Debtf, where EDA GQ = Grant equivalents; Grants = Grants; TA = Total Technical Assistance; B 
Debtf = Debt forgiveness used to adjust bilateral grants.  This adjusted measure uses the same conventional grant data but 
aggregates grant equivalents of loans (GQ) rather than the full face value of all loans deemed concessional.  Source: OECD 
Commitment/GDP  Total amount of the transactions committed in millions of current US$ / GDP . Source: OECD. 
log GDP per capita 
(constant 2001 US$) 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is 
calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in constant U.S. dollars. Source: WDI (World Bank 2006). 
Inflation rate  Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual percentage change in the cost to the average consumer 
of acquiring a fixed basket of goods and services that may be fixed or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The 
Laspeyres formula is generally used. Source: WDI (World Bank 2006). 
Liquid liabilities   Liquid liabilities are also known as broad money, or M3 as a percentage of GDP. They are the sum of currency and deposits 
in the central bank (M0), plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings deposits, foreign 
currency transferable deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, 
foreign currency time deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by residents. Source: 
(World Bank 2006). 
Literacy rate  Adult literacy rate is the percentage of people ages 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple 
statement on their everyday life. Source: WDI (World Bank 2006). 
Corruption  Index for Corruption. It ranges from zero to one, increasing with higher risks of corruption. Assessment of the corruption 
within the political system. The most common form of corruption met directly by business is financial corruption in the form 
of demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, 
police protection, or loans. It is also more concerned with actual or potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, 'favor-for-favors', secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and 
business.Source: International Country Risk Guide (ICRG, 2006) 
Policy  Good policy index. Constructed following the methodology by Burnside and Dollar (2000).  
Value added in the 
agricultural sector 
Agriculture corresponds to ISIC divisions 1-5 and includes forestry, hunting, and fishing, as well as cultivation of crops and 
livestock production. Value added is the net output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. The origin of value added is determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. 
Source: World Development Indicators. 
Value added in the 
industrial sector 
Industry corresponds to ISIC divisions 10-45 and includes manufacturing (ISIC divisions 15-37). It comprises value added in 
mining, manufacturing (also reported as a separate subgroup), construction, electricity, water, and gas. Value added is the net 
output of a sector after adding up all outputs and subtracting intermediate inputs. It is calculated without making deductions 
for depreciation of fabricated assets or depletion and degradation of natural resources. The origin of value added is determined 
by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), revision 3. Source: World Development Indicators. 
Language  Shares of languages spoken as "mother tongues", generally based on national census data. Source: Alesina et al. (2003). 
UK legal origin  Dummy equals one if country has common law origins, zero otherwise.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
French legal origin  Dummy equals one if country has French Commercial Code, zero otherwise.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998). 
Socialist legal origin   Dummy equals one if country has Socialist/Communist laws, zero otherwise.  Source: La Porta et al. (1998).   25
 
TABLE 2 
SUMMARY STATISTICS  
   Observations Mean  Std. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Cross section           
Gini coefficient  111  44.61  11.32  24.50  74.61 
Poverty Headcount index  97  17.98  20.94  0.00  84.31 
Poverty Gap  97  7.12  10.81  0.00  47.02 
Squared Poverty Gap  97 4.02  7.28 0.00  39.21 
ODA/GDP 156  9.49  12.38  0.01  80.80 
EDA/GDP 132  6.19  7.09  -0.03  34.83 
Commitment/GDP 168  4.01  5.62  0.00  46.27 
Corruption 109  0.51  0.17  0.00  0.95 
Inflation rate  138  72.63  188.88  -1.83  1184.35 
M3/GDP 161  41.33  29.85  0.06  188.62 
Literacy rate  135  68.56  24.56  10.52  99.80 
Initial GDP pc  156  6.89  1.23  4.55  10.70 
Panel data (annual data)           
Gini coefficient  761  43.12  10.75  18.10  79.50 
ODA/GDP 3876  8.73  13.34  0.00  241.80 
EDA/GDP 2168  6.37  9.11  -0.15  90.55 
Commitment/GDP 3822  3.92  7.25  0.00  177.93 
Corruption 4134  0.52  0.14  0.00  1.00 
Inflation rate  3360  58.66  576.70  -100.00  23773.13 
Liquid Liabilities  3801  40.09  35.40  0.00  753.98 
Literacy rate  3835  68.09  25.58  5.75  99.80 
GDP per capita  3897  6.95  1.25  3.74  10.70 
% value added in the agricultural sector  3659  23.45  15.14  0.07  74.27 
% value added in the industrial sector  3646  27.97  12.01  4.16  88.03 
UK legal origin  4859  0.38  0.49  0.00  1.00 
French legal origin  4859  0.48  0.50  0.00  1.00 
Socialist legal origin 4859  0.13  0.33  0.00  1.00 
Language 5464  0.41  0.28  0.00  0.92 
Panel data (three-year averaged data)           
Poverty Headcount index  775  19.70  21.60  0.00  89.63 
Poverty Gap  775  7.71  10.75  0.00  55.68 
Squared Poverty Gap  775 4.27 7.15  0.00  41.71   26
 TABLE 3 
SIMPLE CORRELATIONS  
 










GDP pc  % value 













ODA/GDP  0.028                         
  0.485                         
EDA/GDP  0.072  0.955                       
  0.135  0.000                       
Commitment/GDP  0.109  0.659  0.662                    
  0.004  0.000  0.000                    
Corruption  0.085  0.005  0.051  -0.021                   
  0.024  0.789  0.019  0.210                  
Inflation  rate  0.027  -0.387  -0.422  -0.302  -0.330                 
  0.470  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000                 
Liquid Liabilities  0.012  0.007  0.017  0.039  0.033  -0.030               
  0.760  0.705  0.486  0.033  0.073  0.091               
Literacy rate  -0.118  0.043  0.129  -0.075 -0.139  0.341  -0.036               
 0.001  0.012  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.041               
GDP pc  -0.040  -0.282  -0.285  -0.230  -0.305 0.636 0.054  0.240             
 0.309  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.006  0.000             
-0.037 0.305 0.404  0.270  0.262 -0.823 0.026 -0.394  -0.554            % value added in the 
agricultural sector  0.334 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.167 0.000  0.000           
-0.065 -0.364 -0.377  -0.285  -0.066  0.436 0.030  0.056  0.360 -0.580          % value added in the 
industrial sector  0.086 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.104 0.001  0.000  0.000         
UK legal origin  0.041  0.067  0.082  0.094  -0.106 0.065 -0.063  0.170  0.052 0.046  -0.098       
 0.263  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.003  0.006  0.000       
French legal origin  0.471  -0.038  -0.018  -0.040  0.156 -0.072 0.046  -0.138  -0.282  -0.039  0.012 -0.760     
 0.000  0.021  0.404  0.014  0.000  0.000  0.008 0.000  0.000  0.022  0.467  0.000     
Socialist legal origin  -0.555  -0.036 -0.094  -0.070  -0.073 -0.017 0.030  -0.054 0.338  0.000  0.123  -0.301  -0.367   
 0.000  0.028  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.289  0.087 0.001  0.000  0.992  0.000  0.000 0.000   
Language -0.013  0.068  0.085  0.071  0.219  -0.488  -0.010 -0.180  -0.410  0.405  -0.181  0.112 -0.016  -0.104 
   0.724  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.579 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0.286  0.000 
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TABLE 4 
FOREIGN AID AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON INCOME INEQUALITY 
 Gini  coefficient 
ODA/GDP -1.531     
 (0.448)***     
ODA/GDP* Corruption  2.539     
 (0.834)***     
EDA/GDP   -1.468   
   (0.618)**   
EDA/GDP* Corruption    2.783   
   (1.274)**   
Commitment/GDP     -1.974 
     (0.902)** 
   3.399  Commitment /GDP* Corruption 
   (1.589)** 
Corruption -14.941  -11.430  -13.175 
 (10.871)  (11.135)  (11.513) 
Inflation rate  0.009  0.002  0.004 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
M3/GDP -0.065  -0.050  -0.063 
 (0.061)  (0.075)  (0.065) 
Literacy rate  0.146  0.125  0.107 
 (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.087) 
Initial GDP per capita  -3.166  -2.714  -2.797 
 (1.536)**  (1.786)  (1.620)* 
Constant 59.677  56.024  60.062 
 (15.908)***  (17.166)***  (16.959)*** 
Continental dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 60  63  66 
R-squared 0.50  0.49  0.49 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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TABLE 5 
FOREIGN AID AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON POVERTY 
 ODA/GDP  EDA/GDP  Commitment/GDP 
  Dependent variable: Poverty Headcount index 
Aid -0.921  -0.585  -0.496 
 (0.868)  (1.031)  (1.571) 
Aid *corruption  3.099  2.837  2.912 
 (2.020)  (2.561)  (3.445) 
Observations 60  64  66 
R-squared 0.66  0.65  0.64 
  Dependent variable: Poverty Gap 
Aid -0.651  -0.399  -0.561 
 (0.503)  (0.611)  (0.873) 
Aid *corruption  2.001  1.725  2.143 
 (1.155)*  (1.483)  (1.923) 
Observations 60  64  66 
R-squared 0.58  0.56  0.55 
  Dependent variable: Squared Poverty Gap 
Aid -0.453  -0.251  -0.447 
 (0.335)  (0.411)  (0.559) 
Aid *corruption  1.364  1.104  1.545 
 (0.769)*  (0.986)  (1.246) 
Observations 60  64  66 
R-squared 0.52  0.50  0.49 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients shown come from regressions using 
the same specification as those shown in Table 4. 
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TABLE 6 
FOREIGN AID AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON INCOME INEQUALITY  
DYNAMIC PANEL DATA 
 Gini  coefficient 
ODA/GDP -0.743     
 (0.46)     
ODA/GDP* Corruption  1.300     
 (0.78)*     
EDA/GDP   -1.077   
   (1.86)   
EDA/GDP* Corruption    1.884   
   (0.77)**   
Commitment/GDP     -1.427 
     (0.771)* 
Commitment /GDP* Corruption      3.469 
     (1.542)** 
Corruption 1.341  0.855  4.027 
 (5.44)  (13.39)  (3.71) 
Inflation rate  -0.0007  -0.0001  -0.0004 
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
Liquid Liabilities  0.008  -0.058  0.024 
 (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
Literacy rate  -0.042  -0.044  -0.011 
 (0.013)***  (0.013)***  (0.04)*** 
GDP per capita  -0.814  0.823  0.832 
   (0.055)*  (0.054)*  (0.053)* 
First Lag of Gini coefficient  0.821  0.640  0.827 
   (0.064)***  (0.088)***  (0.054)*** 
Constant 7.688  12.685  5.087 
   (2.19)**  (4.18)** (1.58)** 
Observations 245  166  278 
Number of Countries  47 43  55 
F Test  72.477  66.709  74.994 
Prob > F  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions  37.756  36.048  41.39 
P-value 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Test for AR(1) (p-value)  0.076  0.163  0.089 
Test for AR(2) (p-value)  0.256  0.332  0.246 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in
parentheses.  
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TABLE 7 
FOREIGN AID AND INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY ON POVERTY 
DYNAMIC PANEL DATA 
 ODA/GDP  EDA/GDP  Commitment/GDP 
  Dependent variable Poverty Headcount index 
Aid -0.042  0.083  -0.242 
 (0.087)  (0.174)  (0.199) 
Aid *corruption  0.230  -0.307  1.096 
 (0.266)  (0.549)  (0.566)* 
Observations 436  309  470 
Hansen test (p-value)  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Test for AR(1) (p-value)  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Test for AR(2) (p-value)  0.32  0.76  0.46 
  Dependent variable: Poverty Gap 
Aid -0.035  -0.013  -0.137 
 (0.046)  (0.079)  (0.097) 
Aid *corruption  0.108  -0.017  0.560 
 (0.144)  (0.229)  (0.303)* 
Observations 436  309  470 
Hansen test (p-value)  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Test for AR(1) (p-value)  0.00  0.03  0.00 
Test for AR(2) (p-value)  0.93  0.89  0.92 
  Dependent variable: Squared Poverty Gap 
Aid -0.028  -0.021  -0.082 
 (0.034)  (0.044)  (0.065) 
Aid *corruption  0.058  0.011  0.327 
 (0.104)  (0.148)  (0.205) 
Observations 436  309  470 
Hansen test (p-value)  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Test for AR(1) (p-value)  0.00  0.02  0.00 
Test for AR(2) (p-value)  0.67  0.74  0.55 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. Coefficients shown come from regressions using the same specification as those 
shown in Table 6.  
 
 